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THE CORPORATE ENTITY CONCEPT (OR FICTION
THEORY) AND THE MODERN BUSINESS
ORGANIZATION
By KE CHIN WANG*
T HE CORPORATE entity concept is generally accepted as the guid-
ing principle in corporation law But judges allow so many
exceptions to it that we wonder whether such a theory is really
adequate for the modem business organization.1 An examination
of the cases 2 will show there is the greatest confusion and un-
certainty as to when the corporat.e entity WVill be disregarded.
Generally, the concept governs and the separate corporate
entity is observed. In New York, Lake Erie & Western Railroad
v. Nickals,3 the Court held that preferred stockholders were not
entitled as of right to dividends -when profits accrue to the coin-
pany, but that dividends must be declared by the company through
directors, at their discretion, even when owners of preferred stock
were entitled by express agreement with the corporation to divi-
dends at a certain yearly rate.
In Humphreys v. MlcKissock,4 several railroad companies con-
bined to construct an elevator, to be connected with their respec-
tive roads, each to contribute an equal sum towards its costs,
and each to receive corresponding certificates of stock in a corpo-
ration organized to take title to the elevator and to construct it.
*M.A., B.C.L., Ph.D., of the Middle Temple Barrister-at-Law.
IThis inadequacy is further shown by the numerous legislative enact-
ments which ignore the distinct entity and look through the corporation to
the individual shareholders. E.g., Section 15, Federal Securities Act 1933,
12 U. S. C., Section 63, 1935.2Cases relating to taxation will be conclusively discussed in a later
article.
3(1886) 119 U. S. 296, 7 S. Ct. 209, 30 L. Ed. 363.
4(1891) 140 U. S. 304, 11 S. Ct. 779, 35 L. Ed. 473.
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This arrangement was carried out. The Court held, first, that
the interest of each company in it was that of a stockholder in the
coimpany which constructed it, second, that no company had anl
interest in the property itself which it could mortgage, third, that
such stock would not pass to a mortgagee of one of the railroads
under a general description as an appurtenance to the road.
Mr. Justice Field. delivering the opinion of the Court, said,
"That railway company (Wabash Company) had no inter-
est which it could assign, the building belonged to the
Union Elevator Company, and the railway company was
entitled by its subscription, when paid, only to a certain
proportion of its stock. Both the commissioner, and the
Court, in confirming his report and entering the decree
mentioned, seem to have confounded the ownership of
stock in a corporation with ownership of its property But
nothing is more distinct than the two rights, the ownership
of one confers no ownership of the other The propertv of
a corporation is not ubject to the control oj individual imen-
bers, whether acting separately or jointli,. They can ncither
encuniber nor transfer that property, nor authorize others to
do so. The corporation-the artificial being created-holds
the property, and alone can mortgage or transfer it, and
the corporation acts onl, through its officers, subject to the
conditions prescribed by law ",4.1
The corporate entity concept is not always followed. An early
exception was allowed by the United States Supreme Court in
1809
In Bank of United States v, Deveauzx," the headnote reads
"A corporate aggregate. composed of citizens of one state,
may sue a citizen of another state in the circuit court of
the United States. No right is conferred on the bank,
by its act of incorporation, to sue in the federal courts. A
corporation aggregate cannot, in its corporate capacity, be
a citizen."
Marshall, C. J., however allowed such a corporation to sue.
"That invisible, intangible, and artificial being. that mere legal
entity a corporation aggregate, is certainly not a citizen, and,
consequently, cannot sue or be sued in the courts of the United
States, unless the rights of the nembers, tit this respect, can be
exercised in their corporate name. (Here Marshall referred to the
4.1(1891) 140 U. S. 304 at p. 312, 11 S. Ct. 779, 35 L. Ed. 473. The
italics are added. In other quotations found later in this chapter italics will
also be the writer's. See also Smith v. Hurd, (1847) 12 Met. (Mass.) 371.
46 Am. Dec. 687, Aiello v. Crampton, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1912) 201 Fed.
891, Donaldson v. Andresen, (1930) 300 Pa. St. 312, 150 Atd. 616.5(1809) 5 Cranch (U.S.) 61, 3 L. Ed. 38.
THE .CORPORATE ENTITY CONCEPT
.English-case of City of. London v. Wood, 12 Mod.). In that case
the objection, that a corporation was an invisible, intangible thing,
a mere incorporeal entity, in which the characters of the individuals
who composed it were completely merged, was urged and was
considered. The judges unanimously declared that tiey could look
beyond the corporate name, and notice the character of the indi-
vidual.
"The court feels itself authorized by the case in 12 Mod. on a
questi.m of juridiction, to look to the character of the individuals
who compose the corporation, and they think that the precedents
ofthis court, though they were not decisions on argument, ought
not to be absolutely disregarded. ,,G
Since this case there have been many others which disregarded
the distinction between the corporation and its shareholders. Their
examination will show that the courts have not yet fixed any
definite rules for lifting the corporate veil.
I.
It is generally accepted that where the corporate device is
used "to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud,
or defend crime," - the theoretical distinctions between the corpo-
6(1809) 5 Cranch (U.S.) 61, pp. 86-92, 3 L. Ed. 38.
7This phrase is used in many decisions. See eg, Owl Fumigating Corpo-
ration v. California Cyanide Company, Inc., (D. Del. 1928) 24 F (2d) 718,
Majestic Co. v. Orpheum Circuit (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1927) 21 F (2d) 720;
Peckett v. Wood, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1916) 234 Fed. 833, New York Trust
Co. v. Carpenter, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1918) 250 Fed. 668, 672; The Gloucester,(D. Mass. 1923) 285 Fed. 579; Donnell v. Herrmig-Hall-Marvin Safe Co.,
(1908) 208 U. S. 267, 273, 28 S. Ct. 288, 52 L. Ed. 481, City of Winfield
v. Wichita Natural Gas Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1920) 267 Fed. 47. Richnond
& I. Construction Co. v. Richmond, etc. Railway Co., (C.C.A. 6th Cir.
1895) 68 Fed. 105, Watson v. Bonfils, C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1902) 116 Fed.
157, East St. Louis v. Jarvis, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1899) 92 Fed. 735, Aiello
v- Crampton, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1912) 201 Fed. 891, Hall's Safe Co. v.
Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co., (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1906) 146 Fed. 37, niodi-
fied (1908) 208 U. S. 554, 28 S. Ct 350, 52 L. Ed. 616; Erkenbrecher v.
Grant, (1921) 187 Cal. 7, 200 Pac. 641, Peterson v. Chicago, Rock Island
& Pacific Ry. Co., (1907) 205 U. S. 364, 391, 27 S. Ct 513, 51 L. Ed. 841,
Pullman's Palace Car'Co. v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., (1885) 115 U. S.
587, 596, 6 S. Ct. 194, 29 L. Ed. 499; In Re Watertown Paper Co., (C.C.A.
2nd Cir. 1909) 169 Fed. 252, 256; Smyth v. Asphalt Belt Co., (W.D. Tex.
1923) 292 Fed. 876, Georgia S. & F Ry. Co. v. Georgia Public Service
Commission, (N.D. Ga. 1923) 289 Fed. 878, City of Holland v. Holland
City Gas Co., (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1919) 257 Fed. 679; Haskell v. McClintic-
Marshall Co., (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1923) 289 Fed. 405; Stone v. Cleveland,
etc. Ry. Co., (1911) 202 N. Y. 352, 95 N. E. 816; Ulmer v. Lime Rock
Ry. Co., (1904) 98 Me. 579,_ 57 At. 1001, Bergenthal v. State Garage
& Trucking Co., (1922) 179 Wis. 42, 190 N. W 901, Pittsburgh & Buf-
falo Co. v. Duncan, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1916) 232 Fed. 584, Martin v. De-
velopment Co. of America, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1917) 240 Fd. 42. 45, United
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ration and its shareholders will be disregarded. This principle was
relied upon in the decisions of several cases.
In J J McCaskill Comipan, v United States," the hcadnote
reads,
"The presumption that a corporation is, in law, an entity
distinct from its stockholders and officers cannot be carried
so far as to enable the corporation to become a means of
fraud, and knowledge of fraud on the part of the officers,
who are also the principal stockholders and whose interests
are identical, is properly to be imputed to the corporation
itself."
Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the judgment of the Court
"Undoubtedly a corporation is, in law, a person or entity
entirely distinct from its stockholders and officers. It may
have interest distinct from theirs. Their interests, it may be
conceived, may be adverse to its interest, and hence has
arisen against the presumption that their knowledge is its
knowledge, the counter presumption that in transactions
with it when their interest is adverse their knowledge will
not be attributed to it. But while this presumption should be
enforced to protect the corporation it should not be carried
so far as to enable the corporation to become a means of
fraud or a means to evade its responsibilities. ,,8."
The purpose and intention of the corporators, then, will deter-
mine whether or not the corporate veil will be lifted. But since
"the devil himself knows not the mind of man," such a test is
difficult to apply and offers wide variations in interpretation.
In Minifie v Rowley,' an individual, being indebted to a
testator gave a renewal note in the name of a corporation. After-
wards he became executor of the testator, so that treating the debt
as lus, under Code Civil Procedure Sec. 1447, he would not be
relieved of liability by the subsequent running of the statute,
whereas treating it as the debt of the corporation it would have
become barred by limitations. The Court decided to hold its
obligations his. It was found that he had always been the owner
and holder of all its stock, excepting enough shares to qualify
others as directors, not exceeding one to each, had always con-
States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., (E.D. Wis. 1905) 142 Fed.
247, Finch Co. v Robme, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1926) 12 F (2d) 360, Pierce v.
National Bank of Commerce, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1926) 13 F (2d) 40. cert.
denied 273 U. S. 730. 47 S. Ct. 240. 71 L. Ed. 862 McCaskill Co. v. United
States, (1910) 216 U. S. 504, 30 S. Ct. 386, 54 L. Ed. 590 Poatright v
Stemite Radio Corp., (C.C.A. 10th Cir. 1931) 46 F (2d) 385.
8(1910) 216 U. S. 504, 30 S. Ct. 386, 54 L. Ed. 590.
8-1(1910) 216 U. S. 504, 514-515, 30 S. Ct. 386, 54 L. Ed. 590.
(1922) 187 Cal. 481, 202 Pac. 673.
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trolled the board, and always been the representative of and the
only person interested in the corporation.
Lennon, J. said.
"Before the acts and obligations of a corporation can be
legally recogmzed as those of a particular person, and vice
versa, the following combination of circumstances must
be made to appear- First, that the corporation is not only
influenced and governed by that person, but that there is
such a uity of interest and ownership that the indinduality,
or separateness, of the sazd person and corporation has
ceased, second, that the facts are such that an adherence
to the fiction of the separate existence of the corporation
would, under the particular circumstances, sanction a fraud
or promote injustice. ,to
Already we find a variation from the tests laid down in the
McCaskill Company Case It is necessary that there be fraud plus
identity of interest before the corporate entity can be disregarded.
Moreover, the meaning of fraud is extended to include much more
than active wrongdoing.
Lennon, J., continued,
"It is not necessary, as defendants contend, that the con-
plaint allege actual fraud, it is suffictent if the facts set
forth disclose that the dealings were in form with a cor-
poration but sn reality with an. xndindual and that a refusal
to recognize this fact will bring about inequitable results.
In the instant case the assumption of that form (corpo-
rate) will result in the avoidance of a legal obligation,
unless equity intervenes to prevent this injustice. This
equity does by penetrating the fiction of the independent
existence of the corporation. ,,11
In Wenban Estate v. Hewlett, " a corporation was organized
for the sole purpose of owning and operating the owner's property.
It was held that her acts and conduct when dealing with the dirqc-
tor with reference to corporate bonds were the acts and conduct
of the corporation, and the corporation was therefore estopped
to complain that the bonds were not issued or delivered by the
corporation, or that no consideration was received by it from the
pledgees or transferees of such bonds. Again Lennon, J., said, "To
disregard fiction of separate corporate entity it is unnecessary
that actual fraud be shown, it being sufficient if a refusal to recog-
10(1922) 187 Cal. 481, 202 Pac. 673, 676.
"Ibid., see to the same effect Erkenbrecher v. Grant, (1921) 187 Cal.
7, 200 Pac 641.
1-(1924) 193 Cal. 675, 227 Pac. 723.
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nize identity of corporation with that of the individual would bring
about inequitable results. '1 3
That the meaning of fraud has an extended interpretation when
given as the reason for disregarding the corporate entity is further
shown in the case of Shapiro v Wilgus.' 4 A debtor in Pennsyl-
vama, where the law permits appointment of a receiver for the
business of a corporation but not for that of an individual, caused
a corporation to be formed in Delaware and conveyed to it all of
his property in exchange for substantially all of its shares and its
covenant to assume payment of his debts. Three days later, joined
with a simple contract creditor, he sued the corporation in a federal
court in Pennsylvania, invoking jurisdiction on the ground of
diversity of citizenship, and, with the consent of the corporation,
obtained on the same day a decree appointing receivers and en-
joining executions and attachments. The Supreme Court held
that the conveyance and receivership were fraudulent in law as
against non-assenting creditors and the corporate entity will
therefore be disregarded, notwithstanding that the purpose of the
debtor was a laudable one, namely, to prevent disruption of his
business by suits of hostile creditors and to cause the assets to be
nursed for the'benefit of all concerned.
To conclude this class of cases where the test is whether or not
the corporate device is used "to defeat public convenience, justify
wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime," we can do no better than
cite Commercial Cable Staff's Association v Robert Lehman
et al.,' to show the uncertainties ot that test. For in this case in-
volving parent and subsidiary companies, there was an intention
to defeat creditors (fraudulent within the wider meaning of that
word) yet the corporate entity was observed.
Proceedings were instituted under section 77B for the re-
organization of two holding companies, one of which. the Postal
Telegraph and Cable Company owned all the common and a sub-
stantial part of the preferred stock in the other, the "associated
companies." None of the other subsidiaries or affiliates in the ex-
tensive system of which the debtors formed a part had been tech-
nically in reorganization, nor had they at any time submitted them-
selves to the jurisdiction of the Court. The plan, however, pro-
vided for a thorough reshuffling of inter-company holdings and
13(1924) 193 Cal. 675, 227 Pac. 723, 732. See also headnote to the case.
11(1932) 287 U. S. 348, 53 S. Ct. 142, 77 L. Ed. 355, 85 A. L. R. 128.
-
5(C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1939) 107 F (2d) 917 The case is discussed in Note,
(1940) 49 Yale L. J. 590-596.
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properties, which was to be effected by votes cast by the debtor
holding companies as stockholders in the subsidiaries. Cable Staff's
Association, composed of the employees of one of the subsidiaries,
sought to intervene in the reorganization proceedings on the plea
that its interests were adversely affected by the proposed plan. It
was interested in Commercial Cable Company, its employer, as a
creditor only through certain pension clams, which in a large
part depended upon the existence of profits, it asserted, iter alia
(a principal feature of the plan, was to transfer assets of Com-
mercial Cable, a solvent subsidiary, to weaker parts of the system),
that the plan would strip Commercial of all its liquid assets and
thereby render insolvent the new company which was to succeed
it and to assume the pension claims, thus constituting a conveyance
which zwuld be fraudulent as to the trade union. In the district
court, the union lost on the merits. The Second Circuit, speaking
through Judge Learned Hand, in a two-to-one decision, dismissed
the appeal for want of junsdiction on the ground that the union
was not a "creditor" of either debtor subject to the jurisdiction
of the. Court, and hence should not have been allowed to intervene.
He maintains that even though the stockholders of the parent may
be identical with those of the subsidiary, nevertheless the latter's
creditors have no interest in the parent's reorganization, because
their rights are against different assets. The Court seems to argue
that in a situation in which it is unnecessary for a subsidiary to
be a party to the reorganization of the parent, there is no need to
hear objections raised by adversely affected creditors of the sub-
sidiary.:6
II.
In many instances the test for disregarding the fiction of
corporate entity appears to be whether or not the intention was
to evade a statute. This test is also open to the same criticism as
the text explained in Section I-it leaves too much to the dis-
cretion of the particular Court.'
In Northern Securities Company v. United Slates." stock-
lolders of the Great Northern and Northern Pacific Railway Com-
'
6See a detailed discussion of this case in (1940) 49 Yale L. J. pp.
590-596. Also (1940) 24 Minn. L. R. 998 et seq.
17Some cases decide that the intention of evading a statute is not
enough. There must be evidence moreover that the new corporation is "a
mere agent, or instrumentality or department" of another. See e.g. United
States v. Reading Co., (1920) 253 U. S. 26, 40 S. Ct. 425, 64 L. Ed. 760,
discussed under section 3 infra.
's(1904) 193 U. S. 197, 24 S. Ct. 436, 48 L. Ed. 679.
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panies-corporations having competing aid substantially parallel
lines from the Great Lakes and the Mississippi River to the Pacific
Ocean-combined and conceived the scheme of organizing a cor-
poration, under the laws of New Jersey which should hold the
shares of the stock of the constituent companies, such share-
holders, in lieu of their shares in those companies, to receive, upon
an agreed basis of value, shares in the holding corporation. Pursu-
ant to such combination the Northern Securities Company was
organized as the holding corporation through which the scheme
should be executed, and under that scheme such holding corpo-
ration became the holder-more properly speaking, the custodian-
of more than nine-tenths of the stock of the Northern Pacific. and
more than three-fourths of the stock of the Great Northern, the
stockholders of the companies, who delivered their stock. re-
ceiving, upon the agreed basis, shares of stock in the holding
corporation.
Mr Justice Brewer disregarded the corporate entity He found
that the intention was to evade the statute (Act of July 2. 1890)
forbidding restraint of trade. "A corporation, while by fiction of
law recognized for some purposes as a person and for purposes
ot jurisdiction as a citizen, is not endowed with the inalienable
rights of a natural person. It is an artificial person, created and
existing only for the convenient transaction of business. In this
case it was a mere instrumentality by which separate railroad
properties were combined under one control. That combination is
as direct a restraint of trade by destroying competition as the
appointment of a committee to regulate rates. The transfer of
stock to the Securities Company was a mere incident, the manner
in which the combination to destroy competition and thus unlaw-
fully restrain trade was carried out. ,,'o
In Linn & Lane Lumber Company v United States, ° the
owner of land under voidable patents transferred property to his
one-man corporation and allowed the Government to sue him
indiVidually until the Statute of Limitations had run. Held. the
purpose of his action being to evade the statute, the corporate
entity would not he respected.
In Corker v Soper 21 plaintiff formed a corporation for the ex-
press purpose of avoiding statutory double liability on bank stock
19(1904) 193 U S. 197 at page 362, 24 S. Ct. 436, 48 L. Ed. 679.
20(1915) 236 U. S. 574, 35 S. Ct. 440, 59 L. Ed. 725.
21(C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1931) 53 F (2d) 190.
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to which he was going to subscribe.2 2 The Court, while asserting
that the corporate fiction would not be disregarded, nevertheless
held him liable. This appears self-contradictory. Hutcheson, Cir-
cuit Judge, said,
"Appellant's troubles do not arise from the fact that the
.corporate entity of the Laurens Company has been disre-
garded. The judgment of the court below fully recognized
and gave effect to that entity. It is found that, though it did
i fact exist, it existed as a mnere creature organ-i.ed and
nanitaned for the purpose of holding, not really, but as
agent for appellant, the stock which he caused to be put in
its name, that appellant at all times remained the real owner
of the shares, and that the law will look through the subter-
fuge of pretended ownership to fasten liability upon the
shareholder to whom, in fact, the shares belong.
"The view which the court below took, and which we
take, does not require, in fact, it prevents, the conclusion
that the corporation in this case was a fiction, having no
corporate existence. In this view, the judgment, thoroughly
consistent with itself, stands upon the sound foundation on
which alone a just disposition of this case may rest. It cor-
rectly gives effect to the general intent of appellant to create
a corporation for the purpose of placing in its name his and
his wife's stock in the bank, because what was done made that
intent effectual. It with equal correctness denies effect to the
particular intent which induced him to act as -he did, to
avoid liability on the stock, because the things done by ap-
pellant were not in accord, but wholly inconsistent, with that
intent. For while the things done did place the certificates
of stock in the name of the Laurens Company, they did not
divest appellant of his beneficial ownership of them, but
left him the real owner, and therefore liable to assess-
ment... "223
Either the corporation is distinct from its shareholders or
it is not. If it is, then it cannot become the agent of another
except through contract, express or implied. In this case the
Court has failed to understand the essentials of corporate theory.
It professes to adhere to the corporate entity concept while in
fact disregarding it. There is a definite confusion of thought.
2212 U. S. C. A. 63. For its provisions, see Excursus. The Iowa Code, 1931,
sec. 9251, says, "All stock;holders of savings and state banks shall be indi-
vidually liabla to the creditors of such corporations of which they are stock-
holders over and above the amount of the stock held by them therein and
any amount paid thereon, to an amount equal to their respective shares for
all its liabilities accruing while they remained such stockholders." Tile Fed-
eral Statute is to the same effect.
2IIbcd, at page 192.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
In Barbour v Thomas,2 4 the practical effect of organizing a
holding company was to escape the statutory double liability of
bank directors. The corporate entity was again disregarded to
prevent this result.
Hayes, District Judge, said
"It is well settled now, after years of conflict and con-
fusion, that the corporate concept cannot be employed to
evade a statute or to defeat its intent. In such cases
the Courts treat it as a mere sham, a device, anid a duninty.
It is utterly inconsistent with these laws (National
Banking Laws) for a holding company to acquire all the
stock of a national bank, and control it in the manner shown
by the evidence in this record, except on the theory that
it existed as an agency for the stockholders of the batik.
who are, to all intents and purposes, still stockholders there-
in, and liable as such stockholders for any bank stock assess-
ment.
"Prior to the organization of the holding company, the
stockholders of this bank were individually liable for the
stock assessment. They cannot destroy this liability and
circumvent the statute by creating a holding company and
conveying their stock to it.
"The law will unmask the apparent ownership of bank
stock and fasten liability for the assessment on the 'real'
owner If the mask is a corporate device, it will be
removed like any other sham."
Similarly, in Metropolitan Holding Company v Snyder,-" the
Court held that the contingent liability on shares of stock in
a national bank cannot be circumvented by the organization of a
holding company, and directors of the bank who have organized
such a company to purchase shares of stock, even though iii good
faith, will be held liable where the directors knew the bank was in
a precarious position. Here the intention of the individual seems
to have been subordinated to the practical result of his act in de-
termining the circumstances for disregarding the corporate
entity
But, in Pearson v All Borg,2 the corporate entity was ob-
served though the net result was to escape the statutory double
liability The Court held that an insolvent national bank's stock-
24(E.D. Mich. 1933) 7 F Supp. 21.
25(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1935) 79 F (2d) 263.26 (N.D. Il1. 1938) 23 F Supp. 837 See also Burrows v. Etiery et al.,
(1938) 285 Mich. 86, 280 N. W 120.
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holders, transferring their'stock to a holding company, - are not
liable for assessment thereon, in the absence of showing in com-
plaint ,of bank's receiver, suing to enforce such liability, that
they transferred the stock for the purpose of evading liability or
that transferee -had no other assets or held stock merely as agent
or trustee and distributed dividends thereon to assignors.
.Holly, District Judge, declared,
"One of the principal purposes of a corporation as dis-
tinguished from a partnership is to avoid individual respon-
sibility for the debts of the enterprise. It is the contention
of plaintiff that this rule does not apply to holding com-
panies whose assets consist principally of national bank
-stocks, or stocks of national and other banking institutions.
I do not think that the courts so hold. Whether the
shareholders of the holding company shall be held respon-
sible for an assessment levied upon bank stocks standing
in the name of the corporation depends upon the circum-
stances of the particular case.
"If it appeared from the complaint that the shareholders
of People's National Bank had transferred their stock to
Bancorporation for the purpose of evading their statutory
liability, if Bancorporation had no other assets than the stock
of People's National Bank, if it appeared from facts stated
in the complaint that Bancorporation was holding the stock
merely as agent or trustee, if the dividends on People's Na-
tional Bank stock when received by Bancorporation were
distributed to the assignors of that stock, then, in my
opinion, the assignors of the stock to Bancorporation might
be held liable for the assessment against the holders of the
stock which had been held by them respectively. But none of
these facts appear. and I feel constrained to hold that they
are not liable for the assessment plaintiff seeks to enforce.
"328
Neither can other statutes be evaded through the scheme of
mcdrporation. In National Labor Relations Board v. Honvood
Retinnng Coinpany,2 9 proceedings were instituted under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (29 USCA Sec. 151 et seq.) to coin-
pel corporations to cease and desist from unfair labor practices.
2 TheBanking Act, while permitting the ownership of a majority of
stock in bank which is a member of the Federal Reserve System by a hold-
ing company, requires every such company whose darter does not pre-
serve its stockholders' individual liability for assessment on bank stock held
by it to possess other readily marketable assets in an amount of 25 per cent
of par value of such stock.
28 (N.D. Ill. 1938) 23 F Supp. 837 at pages 840-844.
-29(C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1938) 98 F (2d) 97
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The Court supported the Board's finding that one of the cor-
porations maintained an attitude of refusal to bargain with the
unions as the proper representative of the employees, and. dis-
regarding the corporate entity, decided that such a situation con-
tinued during the time of the lockout and after it discontinued
its business in the state and transferred its machinery and busi-
ness to the other corporation in another state.
The Commodities Clause of the Hepburn Act3" forbids rail-
roads to carry commodities in which they have an interest.
The problem arises whether a railroad may carry articles
owned by a corporation which is a subsidiary of the railroad.
Will the corporate entity be disregarded? Earlier cases show that
control through stock ownership alone is sufficient to bring the
case within the statutory prohibition,3 but later cases seem to
require something more. There must be evidence of direct con-
trol. 32
Many states having usury statutes deny corporations the de-
fense of usury 11 Hence a borrower who is unable to secure capital
otherwise may be advised to incorporate. The corporation is then
loaned the money at what would be a usurious rate of interest
were it loaned directly to the stockholder as an individual. Courts
have held that the borrower is bound by his action and cannot
set up the defense of usury, despite the fact that an avoidance
of the effect of the statute was the sole purpose of mcorpora-
tion. 3
4
The large number of automobile accidents and judgment proof
drivers has caused some states to pass statutes which suspend
licenses while judgments resulting from automobile accidents re-
main unsatisfied. and which prevent a judgment debtor from
licensing any car during that time. To escape this result, the judg-
ment debtor transfers his automobile to a corporation formed by
3034 Stat. 585 (1906) 49 U. S. C. Sec. 1, 8 (1934).
"'See cases collected by Wormser, Piercing the Veil of Corporate
Entity, (1912) 12 Col. L. R. 496, 517 (1936) 36 Col. L. R. 1175.32See U. S. v. Coal Roads. (1909) 213 U. S. 366, 29 S. Ct. 527, 53 L.
Ed. 836, cf. U. S. v. Lehigh Valley Railway Co., (1911) 220 U. S. 257 31
S. Ct. 387, 55 L. Ed. 458.33See. e.g., Delaware Revenue Code, (1935) Sec. 3101, Maryland Ann.
Code, (1924) Art. 23, Sec. 131, Ohio General Code Ann., (1937) Secs.
8623-78.
34See Jenkins v. Moyse, (1930) 254 N. Y. 319, 172 N. E. 521, Carozza
v. Federal Finance & Credit Co., (1921) 149 Md. 223. 131 At. 332. But
contrast Western States Acceptance Corp. v. Tuttle, (1930) 210 Cal. 51.
290 Pac. 574. 575 IXman Realty Co. v. Delaney Garage, (1920) 190 App.
Div 745. 180 N. Y S. 297, 298.
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hun. But the Court, without much hesitation, "ignores the entity"
to prevent this modification of the effect of the statute.'5
This concludes our exannation of cases where the corporate
entity was discarded or not upon the answer to the question, was
the intention of the corporators to evade a statute or modify its
effect."
III.
Another test followed by many courts is this the corporate
entity will be disregarded when it is but an "instrumentality,
adjunct, agent or alter ego" of an individual or another corpora-
tion. Being the vaguest of all tests, it is also the most unsatisfac-
tory upon which judges could base their decision.3
35See Garford Trucking Co. v. Hoffman, (1935) 114 N. J. L. 522, 177
At. 882.3GFor other cases of similar nature, see United States v. Milwaukee
Refrigerator Transit Co., (E.D. Wis. 1905) 142 Fed. 247, 255, Edward
Finch Co. v. Robie, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1926) 12 F (2d) 360; Page v.
Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1931) 53 F (2d) 27, Callas
v. Independent Taxi Owners' Assoc., (C.A. Dist. Col. 1933) 66 F (2d)
192, Laurent v. Anderson, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1934) 70 F (2d) 819; Mc-
Caskill Co. v. United States, (1910) 216 U. S. 504, 30 S. Ct. 386, 54 L. Ed.
590; Trustees System Co. of Pennsylvania v. Payne, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1933)
65 F (2d) 103, Chicago, Mil. & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Mirm. Civic & Com-
merce Ass'n, (1918) 247 U. S. 490, 501, 38 S. Ct. 553, 62 L. Ed. 1229; Ohio
Valley National Bank v. Hallitt, (1907) 204 U. S. 162, 168, 27 Sup. Ct.
179, 51 L. Ed. 423, United States v. Lehigh Valley' R.R. Co., (1911) 220
U. S. 257, 273, 31 S. CL 387, 55 L. Ed. 458, Panly v. State Loan & Trust Co.,
(1896) 165 U. S. 606-623, 17 S. Ct. 701, 41 L. Ed. 1130; United States v.
Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. R. Co., (1915) 238 U. S. 516, 35
S. Ct. 873, 59 L. Ed. 1438, Northern Securities Co. v. United States, (1904)
193 U. S. 197, 24 S. Ct 436, 48 L. Ed. 679; English v. Gamble (C.C.A.
8th Cir. 1928) 26 F (2d) 28, People v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co.,
(1929) 246 Mich. 198, 224 N. W 438, where it was stated that "When a
corporation exists as a device. to evade legal obligations, the courts, without
regard to actual fraud, will disregard the entity theory." P 440.
In a later case, Inland Development Co. v. Comm'r, (C.C.A. 10th Cir.
1941) 120 F (2d) 986, it was decided that where it could be shown that
the true policy of a specific statute requires the disregard of a subsidiary's
entity, the corporate concept will be overruled.
- Professor Fuller of Harvard says, "These terms are not, of course,
self-defimng their use is clearly part of a judicial technique, too often
obscuring the real issues involved, employed to accomplish results which
would not logically flow from a literal adherence to the conventional dogma
that a corporation is a person separate and distinct from its shareholders."
(1938) 51 Harv. L. R. 1373 at page 1378. Cf. also Latty, notes, Judicial
Supervision of the One-man- Corporation, (1932) 45 Harv. L. R. 1084,
Corporate Entity-Its Limitations as a Useful Legal Conception, (1926)
36 Yale L. J. 254 et seq.
Professor Fuller gives a detailed account of the application of this test
for one-man companies. Since these companies are necessarily controlled
by one individual, it would seem that all such organizations are the "in-
strumentalities, etc.' of another. Yet this is not the case. The true test, if
there is one, cannot be discovered by examining the decisions. The law is
extremely uncertain and Professor Fuller suggests that "The situation is
one which calls for legislative action." See (1938) 51 Harv. L. R. 1373-1405.
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(i) It has been settled long ago that identity of stockholders,
directors and other officers does not make one company the "in-
strumentality" of another company Similarly, the ownership of
all the stock in a company does not make that company the "alter
ego" of the sole stockholders. Something more is required to dis-
regard the corporate entity The control must be more intimate.
In Richmond & I Const. Co. v Richmond, Etc Rv. Co.,Z18
Lurton, Circuit Judge, said,
"It (the appellants) contends that under the evidence in this
case the K company was, in legal effect, the railroad com-
pany and that engagements made by it were, in legal effect.
engagements made by the railroad company In support of
this, appellant has endeavored to show that the stockholders
in each corporation were the same, and that the K company
dominated and controlled the railroad company The K coi-
pany was a legal corporation, wholly distinct and separate
trom the railroad company The fact that the stockholders
in each may have been the same persons does not operate to
destroy the legal identity of either corporation. Neither does
the fact that one corporation exercised a controlling inflt-
ence over the other through the ownership of its stock or
through the identity of stockholders, operate to make either
the agent of the other, or to merge the two corporations into
one. "39
In Peterson v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co.,"'
Mr Justice Day, delivering the opinion of the Court. said,
"It is true that the Pacific Company practically owns the
controlling stock in the Gulf Company, and that both com-
panies constitute elements of the Rock Island System. But
the holding of the majority interest ti the stock does not
mean the control of the active officers and agents of the
local company dotug busines tn Texas. That fact gave the
Pacific Company the poweer to control the road by the elec-
tion of the directors of the Gulf Company, who could tn
turn elect officers or remove them from the places already
held. bitt this power does not make it the company transact-
ing the local business.
"The conduct and control of the business in Texas was
entrusted to the Gulf Company As the largest stockholder
38(C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1895) 68 Fed. 105.
39Ibid., at page 108. In this case the appellant company had knowledge
of the close relations of K company to the railroad company. It was not
misled. This element probably had much to do with the outcome of the
case. Cf. Trust Company v. Bridges, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1893) 57 Fed. 753.
See also Pullman's Palace Car Company v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co..
(1885) 115 U. S. 587 6 S. Ct. 194, 29 L. Ed. 499.40(1907) 205 U S. 364, 27 S. Ct. 513, 51 L. Ed. 841.
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the Pacific Company had an interest in that business, but a
separate corporation had been legally created in Texas, with
authonty to make contracts and control its own affairs and
carry on its own business. This separate corporation had its
own officers,j a large amount of its own property, was re-
sponsible for its contracts and to persons with whom it
dealt."-"
A Georgia statute treated as an employer "Any employing unit,
which together with one or more other employing units, is owned
or controlled (by legally enforceable means or otherwise) directly
or indirectly by the sane interests, and which, if treated as
a single umt with such other employing units, would be an
employer under Paragraph (1) of this subsection." The Court
in Independent Gasoline Co. v. Bureau of Unemployment ,Com-
pensaton,42 held this mvilid, on the grounds that a corporation re-
tains its septrate and independent character regardless of the
ownership of its capital stock.
Duckworth, Justice, said,
"The defendant is a corporation, and as such is an artificial
person. This legalentity retains its separate and independent
character regardless of the ownership of its capital stock,
and as such it cannot be held liable for the obligations of a
stockholder. Nor are the stockholders liable for the obliga-
tions of the corporation.
43
The case of Benner-Coryell Lumber Company, Inc. v. Indiana
Unemployment Compensation Board44 again decided that control
through ownership of stock was not enough for disregarding the
corporate entity The relationship must be more intimate.
It called into question the validity of Section 2 g4 of the Indi-
ana Unemploymient Compensation Law, Acts of 1939, ch. 121,
Sec. 1. This section provides that the term "employer" means.
"Any employing unit which together with one or more other em-
ploying units, is owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the
same interests, or wich owns and controls one or more other
employing units, and which, if treated as a single unit with such
other employing units or interests, or both, would be an em-
ployer under paragraph (1) of this subsection." The language
used is to be construed in connection with sec. 2g1 of the Act, by
41(1907) 205 U. S. 364 at 391-393, 27 S. Ct. 513, 51 L. Ed. 841. Italics
are added. -See also Marsh v. Southern New England Railway Corp.,
(1918) 230 Mass. 483, 120 N. E. 120; American Union Line Y. Oriental
Navigation Co., (1924) 239 N. Y. 207, 146 N. E. 338.
42(1940) .190 Ga. 613, 10 S. E. (2d) 58.
13Ibid., at pages 59-60.
44(1940) 218 Ind. 20, 29 N. E. (2d) 776.
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which an employer is further defined as a unit having in its
employ eight or more persons.
Shake, Judge, declared,
"The question which we are called upon to answer is there-
tore reduced to this Do the owners of a majority of the
stock of a corporation have such control thereof as to make
their ownership or control the basis of classification for
the purpose of imposing excise taxes on such corporations
in the manner prescribed by the act under consideration
That a corporation is a legal entity separate and distinct
from its stockholders, individually or collectively considered.
is not open to debate. It is equally well established that a
majority of the stockholders have the right to manage
and control the corporation, under certain limitations.
"As has already been observed, the law regards a cor-
poration as a distinct entity. This status is unaffected bi,
the fact that a majority of its stock may or may not be con-
trolled by the same intcrests.
He concludes,
"Regardless of the shades of meaning that may be attributed
to the word ('control'), we are convmed that in the in-
terpretation of the act before us, control of a corparation
must be regarded as something more than that remote con-
trol that arises out of the fact that a majority of the holders
of its voting stock may dictate who its directors shall
b e . ,4 5
Before concluding this part of Section III which has attempt-
ed to point out that control through mere ownership of stock (in
the case of one-man companies) or identity of directors and share-
holders (in the case of parent and subsidiary or related com-
pames) 41 is not enough for the courts to disregard the corporate
entity concept, several other cases should be noted. Carsican
Bank v Johnson,"; shows that in many instances even this
'indirect control' is sufficient.
45Ibid., at pages 778-781.
4 OSee also Majestic Co. v Orpheum Circuit. (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1927) 21
F (2d) 720; Owl Fumigating Corp. v. California Cyanide Co.. Inc.. (1).
Del. 1928) 24 F (2d) 718, In Re Adolf Jobel, Inc., (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1936)
80 F (2d) 849.
But the discussion of these two types of cases together is criticized by
Hahn, Justice, in Vennerbeck & Clase Co. v. Juergens Jewelry Co.. (1933)
53 R. I. 135. 164 At. 509 at page 510. "The decisions rendered ii cases
dealing with parent and subsidiary corporations, although they are in many
ways similar to the instant case (a one-man company case), are to be con-
fined in their application to that class of cases alone, being ained at the
evils in the financial structure of subsidiary corporation.
47(1919) 251 U. S. 68, 40 S. Ct. 82, 64 L. Ed. 141.
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_Mr. Justice Pitney said,
"Because the Bank and the loan company were distinct
legal organizations, operating under separate charters de-
rived from different sources, and possessing independent
powers and privileges, we are constrained to hold that,
notwithstanding the identity of stock ownership and their
close affiliation in management, for some purposes they must
be regarded as separate corporations, for instance, as being
capable in law of contracting with each other. Butt tn
considering the practical effect of such. inter-corporate deal-
ings, especially as bearing upon the duties of the common
-directors and the authority of the stockholders to control
them, we need -not and ought not to overlook the identity
of stock ownership. Thus, the transfer of the notes in Feb-
ruary, 1908, from the Bank to the loan company, in con-
sideration of their full face value ostensibly or actually
paid by the company to the Bank, evidently could have no
effect in relieving the stockholding interest from loss, since
each stockholder of one corporation had a corresponding
interest in the stock of the other, and any theoretical sav-
ing that accrued to him as a stockholder of the Bank was
balanced by a corresponding loss sustained in his capacity
as a stockholder of the company. 2,4s
4SFor the proposition that ownership of stock is not enough for dis-
regarding the corporate entity, see further, City of Holland v. Holland
City Gas Co., (C.C,A. 6th Cir. 1919) 257 Fed. 679; Watson v. Bonfils,
(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1902) 116 Fed. 157, Aiello v. Crampton, (C.C.A. 8th Cir.
1912) 201 Fed. 891, East St. Louis etc. Co. v. Jarvis, (C.C.A. 7th Cir.
1899) 92 Fed. 735, City of Winfield v. Wichita Natural Gas Co., (C.C.A.
8th Cir. 1920) 267 Fed. 47, New York Trust Co. v. Carpenter, (C.C.A.
6th Cir. 1918) 250 Fed. 668, 672; Minifie v. Rowley, (1922) 187 Cal. 481,
202 Pac. 673, Syndicate Co. v. Bohn, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1894) 65 Fed. 165,
169; Klein v. Board of Tax Supervisors, (1930) 282 U. S. 19, 24, 51 S. Ct.
15, 75 L. Ed. 140, 73 A. L. R. 679; Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v.
Doughton, (1926) 270 U. S. 69, 81, 46 S. Ct. 256, 70 L. Ed. 475, Newton
Manufacturing Co. v. White, (1871) 42 Ga. 148, Exchange Bank of
Macon v. Macon Const. Co., (1895) 97 Ga. 1, 25 S. E. 326; Waycross
Air-Lme R. Co. v. Offerman & Western Ry. Co., (1900) 109 Ga. 827,
35 S. E. 275, Garmany v; Lawton, (1906) 124 Ga. 876, 53 S. E. 669;
Central of Ge6rgia Ry. Co. v. Manhattan Trust Co., (1910) 135 Ga. 4/2,
69 S. E. 708, Liberty Lumber Co. v. Silas, (1936) 181 Ga. 774, 184 S. E.
-286, Shingler v. Shingler, (1937) 184 Ga. 671, 192 S. E. 824, Hollings-
worth v. Georgia Fruit Growers, Inc., (1938) 185 Ga. 873, 196 S. E. 766;
Simpson v. Charters, (1939) 188 Ga. 842, 5 S. E. (2d) 27, Interstate Com-
merce Commission v. Stickney, (1909) 215 U. S. 98, 30 S. Ct 66, 54 L.
Ed. 112, U. S. v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R.R. Co., (1915)
238 U. S. 516, 35 S. Ct. 873, 59 L. Ed. 1438, Stone v. Cleveland, C. C.
St. L. Ry. Co., (1911) 202 N. Y. 352, 95 N. E. 816; Gravel Switch Co. v.
Lebanon, L. and L. T. Co., (1910) 139 Ky. 151, 129 S. W 559; Martin v.
Development Co. of America, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1917) 240 Fed. 42, 45,
Haskell v. McClintic-Marshall Co., (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1923) 289 Fed. 405,
Finn v. Mickle Lumbef Co., (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1930) 41 F (2d) 676, 677,
Owl Fumigating Corp. v. California Cyanide Co., (D. Del. 1928) 24 F(2d) 718, 719, affirmed 30 F (2d) 812, 813.
Mere identity of directors also is not enough. See F P McKay Co. v.
Savery House Hotel Co., (1918) 184 Io\a 260, 168 N. W -95, Union
Sulphur Co. v. Freeport Texas Co., (D.Del. 1918) 251 Fed. 634, 661.
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But in other cases, although control is carried to extreme
lengths, the separate entity of the subsidiary may be upheld by
the Courts.
In Interstate Transit Lines v Comni'r of Internal Revenue 49
the petitioner, Interstate Transit Lines, claimed in its income tax
return for 1936 a deduction in the amount of $28,100.66 as a
loss sustained by its wholly owned subsidiary, Union Pacific
Stages of California, and absorbed by the petitioner under a con-
tract. The deduction was refused.
The petitioner is a corporation created under the laws of
Nebraska with its principal office at Omaha. For the purpose of
augmenting its income by means of additional revenues derived
from carrying California intrastate traffic, petitioner organized
under the laws of California the wholly-owned subsidiary corpora-
tion.
There were two contracts.
The absorption agreement recited that all the capital stock of
the subsidiary was owned by the petitioner, that the petitioner op-
erated busses between various points but operated no busses in
California, that the subsidiary operated busses in California that
the subsidiary was maintained as an operating subsidiary for the
sole benefit of the petitioner, and that to secure such benefits it was
necessary that the schedules of the two corporations be coordinated.
The agreement then provided that the subsidiary agreed to oper-
ate busses upon such routes and schedules and under such rules
and regulations as may be directed by the petitioner There was
a further stipulation that petitioner would reimburse its subsi-
diary for any deficits incurred in its operations and that the sub-
sidiary would pay over to the petitioner any profits resulting
from its operations, payments to be made at the end of each
calendar year
Under an operating contract it was agreed that as the busses
of each party crossed the state line they would pass into the
custody of the other party, that as one party took possession of
the busses of the other under this arrangement the owner should
be designated lessor and the other party lessee, that expense of
operations should be apportioned between the parties monthly
These appear but superficial attempts to cover up what was
in effect one and the same business. It was further found that
there was no change in the conduct of the business after the par-
49(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1942) 130 F (2d) 136.
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ties began operating. No additional expense was incurred other
than the cost to the principal of keeping the separate accounts
for the subsidiary. Both corporations had the same officers and
directors. Both contracts were executed for each party by the
same person as president of each company. The subsidiary had its
own accounting records, employees, busses, directors and cor-
porate minute book. Its accounting records were kept at the
-offices of the principal by the employees who kept the principal's
records. The principal collected all the revenues of the subsidiary
and paid all of its bills. The subsidiary had no separate bank
account.
On the facts, the control exercised by the parent over its sub-
sidiary -was complete. It went beyond mere identity of stock-
holders, difectors and other officers. Nonetheless, the Court re-
fused to disregard the corporate entity of the subsidiary. 0
In Cintas v. American Car and Foundry Co."' we find another
"border" case.
The defendant -was organized under the laws of New Jersey.
It acquired or established several subsidiaries which were foreign
corporations as they were not incorporated under the laws of New
Jersey. All the stock of these companies was owned either by the
defendant or one of its, other subsidiaries. The officers and direc-
tors of the subsidiaries were officers, directors or employees
of the defendant. In most instances the principal offices of these
companies were at the principal office of the defendant in New
York. The books, records and accounts of the subsidiaries were
kept by the auditing department of the defendant although sepa-
rate records and accounts were maintained by each subsidiary.
For the purpose of paying dividends, defendant kept its books
5OThe Columbia Law Review had this to say about the case: "At
times, the line of demarkation becomes rather blurred. Some courts will
allow the parent to disaffirm the entity of a subsidiary set up as a pure
formality for honest business convenience, while others reach contrary de-
cisions in hardly distinguishable situations, where the resulting ordinary
hardship is compensated t)y the business usefulness of the subsidiary.
"The instant case is one of conflicting equities. On one hand, the
requisite strict control was present. The subsidiary was a mere formality
and every transaction between it and petitioner %vas a purely bookkeeping
operation. On the other hand, the subsidiary was not a niere instru-
mentality of petitioner since it did things petitioner itself could not do, and
its cost wis therefore justified by actual business advantage."
See Columbia Law Review, farch, 1943, page 234.
In Armour and Company v. Bailey, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1942) 132 F
(2d) 386, the idea that retention of control of tie property after it passed
into the hands of the corporation made it merely the "alter ego" of
Bailey was examined by the court and rejected.
51(1942) 131 N. J. Eq. 419, 25 A. (2d) 418.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
on a consolidated basis-that is, it computed dividends on the
basis of the net earnings of the entire enterprise, the parent and
subsidiaries combined.
Here, too, there was more than identity of stockholders, direc-
tors and other officers. It is evident that effective control was
maintained by the parent over its subsidiaries and the whole en-
terprise was run as one business. Nonetheless, the Court held
that the parent must be considered a distinct entity for the pur-
pose of determining dividends, and that the earnings of the
subsidiaries can inure to the benefit of the parent's preferred
stockholders only at the time they are paid to the parent as
dividends. 5 2
(ii) The above section shows that identity of stockholders,
directors and other officers is not enough to make one corporation
the "instrumentality, adjunct, agent or alter ego" of another There
must be other evidence of effective control. Just what constitutes
that control is a difficult question and does not appear to have
been defined by either judge or jury
Sometimes that control is dependent on the purpose of the
incorporator. If the court is reasonably satisfied that he had no
intention to make the corporation his agent or instrumentality,
then the corporate entity will be preserved. But any test which
depends on mental elements becomes vague and uncertain.
In Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul R'y Co. v Min'neapolis
Civic and Commerce Assn. , 3 two railroad companies, between
them owning all the stock and controlling completely the property
and operations of a third company, which had legal title to term-
inal tracks, caused separate switching charges to be made i its
name on traffic moved by them over those tracks, although for
substantially the same service over terminals which each owned
separately neither made any charge in addition to its line-haul
rates. A state commission, finding that the practice discriminated
against shippers on the third company's tracks, ordered that the
separate charges be discontinued and that the tracks be operated
as a part of the terminal properties of the other companies, In
intrastate traffic. The United States Supreme Court held. ilter alia,
that upon examination of the findings and.evidence, the commis-
5
2The case is noted in (1943) 56 Harvard Law Review 133. Its terse
comment was. "the court's concern solely with the conceptualistic notion of
whether to pierce the corporate entity seems highly artificial." hits writer
shares the view that the case is unsatisfactory. See also Mills v. Couiii r
of Internal Revenue. (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1943) 132 F (2d) 753.
53(1918) 247 U S. 490. 38 S. Ct. 553. 62 L. Ed. 1229.
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sion and the courts below were justified in holding the third com-
pany a mere agency or instrumentality of the other two.
Mr. Justice Clarke delivered the opinion of the Court.
"W¥ith the facts thus summarized, it is difficult to
conceive of a plan for the control of a jointly owned com-
pany and for the operation of a jointly owned track more
complete than this one is and it is sheer sophistry to argue
that, because it is technically a separate legal entity, the
Eastern Company is an independent public carrier, free in
the conduct of its business from the control of the two coin-
panies which own it and therefore free to impose separate
carrying charges upon the public. Much emphasis is
laid upon statements made in various decisions of this court
that ownership, alone, of capital stock in one corporation
by another, does not create an identity of corporate interest
between the two companies, or render the stockliolding
conpany.the owner of the property of the other, or create
the relation of principal and agent or representative between
the two.
"While the statements of the law thus relied upon are
satisfactory in the connection in which they were used, they
have been plainly and repeatedly held not applicable where
stock ownership has been resorted to, not for the purpose of
participating in the affairs of a corporation in the normal
and -sual manner, but .for the purpose, as in this case, of
controlling a subsidiary company so that it may be used as
a in-re agency or instrumientality of the owzniig conipany or
compames. In such a case the courts will not permit
themselves to be blinded or deceived by mere forms of
law but, regardless of fiction, will deal with the substance
of the transaction involved as if the corporate agency did
not exist and as the justice of the case may require." 4
Similarly, in United States v. Reading Company," the Court
syllbus read in part,
"While the ownership by a railroad company of shares
of the capital stock of a mmiig company does not neces-
sarily create an identity of corporate interest between the
two such as to render it unlawful under the commodities
clause for the railroad company to transport in interstate
commerce the products of such mining company, yet where
such ownership of stock is resorted to, not for the purpose
of participating in the affairs of the corporation in which
it is held in a manner normal and usual with stockholders,
but for the purpose of making it a iiere agent, or instri-
mentality or department of another coipany, the courts
54Ibid., at pages 498-501.
55(1920) 253 U. S: 26, 40 S. Ct. 425, 64 L. Ed. 760.
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will look through the forms to the relation between the
companies as if the corporate entity did not exist and will.
deal with them as the justice of the case may require.
"Applying this rule, held, that the relation between the
Central Railroad Company of New Jersey and the Lehigh
and Wilkes-Barre Coal Company, with the former owning
eleven-twelfths of the capital stock of the latter and using
the latter as the coal mining department of its organization,
violates the commodities clause, and for that reason must
be dissolved.""5
In Detroit Motor Applianmce Co. v General Motars Corpora-
tioin s the Court found that the purpose of defendant corporation
in forming subsidiaries was to make them its agents. Hence that
corporation itself was in contempt of decree enjoining infringement
of patents committed by them. The corporate entity was disre-
garded because control here was "direct."
Lindley, District Judge, declared
"" This decision is tit line with the general rule in
such cases to the effect that where stock ownership control
of a subsidiary corporation is resorted to, not for the pur-
pose of participating tit the affairs of the corporation tit the
normal and usual manner of a stockholder, but for the pur-
pose of so controlling a subsidiary company that it becomes
a mere agency of the owning company, the latter mal, not
escape liability for the acts of the subsidiary
"The control of General Motors Company over such
subsidiaries is shown by the instructions of the parent
company to the subsidiaries with regard to this case. After
the contempt proceedings were instituted General Motors
sent to its subsidiaries written directions that they 'must
not offer for sale or sell either used cars or new cars of the
above mentioned models.' Such is plain assunption of
authority over the subsidiaries. It is not a request, but a
demand. ":,p
(iii) As has been pointed out, the purpose of a corporator is
difficult to determine this test for disregarding the corporate
entity is therefore a vague one. Courts in recent years have at-
i(1920) 253 U. S. 26 at page 62, 40 S. Ct. 425, 64 L. Ed. 760.
5S(E.D. Ill. 1933) 5 F Supp. 27
59Ibid.. at pages 30-31. See also Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Commn'r,
(C.C.A. 10th Cir. 1942) 127 F (2d) 220, where the circuit court decided
that the corporate entity of the parent and the subsidiary will not he dis-
regarded if the parent "elected to organize the subsidiary to serve legitimate
business purposes." See also Gulf, C. & S. F Ry. Co. v. Cities Service,(D.Del. 1922) 281 Fed. 214, Davis v. Alexander, (1925) 269 U. S. 114, 46
S. Ct. 34. 70 L. Ed. 186, Wabash Ry. Co. v. American Refrigerator
Transit Co.. (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1925) 7 F (2d) 335.
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tempted to make it more definite and concise. Where there is a
failure to maintain a separate corporate organization, or to follow
the ordinary routine of corporate procedure, then the courts will
infer such intimate control as is required for identifying the
corporation with its sole shareholder or its parent corporation.
Such a test has the advantage of clarity, but to rely on the mere
formalities of corporate machinery seems grossly inadequate as a
basis of observing the entity theory.00
A clear statement of the trend of authority is given in Fletcher's
work on Corporations. "Section 42-Corporate agencies or affili-
ates of other corporations."
" Gourts have pointed out that swhat is called the
metaphor of agency tends to confuse thought, unless re-
gard is given to the actual submergence of independent
management of the subsidiary by its own directors by a
direct management by the principal corporation, and the
test of this is said to be rather in the forn in which it is
exercised than in the substance of control by stockholding.
There may have been no actual consensual agency, but if
there was actual dominance and direction by which the act
vas the act of the parent corporation it is responsible. "
"Whether one is a mere agency or instrumentality or they
are identical, is a question of fact to be proved by com-
-petent evidence, This question of fact depends on nany
circumstances overcoming or failing to overcome the indicia
of separate entities, saieness of iembers, officer, and ob-
jects, and the absence of distinct interests, being indicia of
agency or identity, while differences in officers, objects or
conduct are indicia of separate recognicable entities." 61
These conclusions are supported by the following cases.
In Commerce Trust Co. v. W/oodbury1 ' Fars, Circuit Judge,
said.
"fFew questions of law are better settled than that a cor-
poration is ordinarily a wholly separate entity from its
stockholders, whether they be one or more. Likewise,
we think it must be conceded that neither ownership of all
of the stock of one corporation by another, nor the identity
of officers in one with officers in another, creates a merger
6OEspecially is this true in the case of one-man companies. See Fuller,
The Incorporated Individual-A Study of the One-Man Company, (1938)
51 Harv. L. R. 1373-1405.
6OFletcher's Corporations, Permanent Edition, Volume 1, Section 43,
pages- 154, 158. Passages cited with approval 'of Hamilton, Justice, in
Wade and Wade v. Central Broadcasting Co., (1939) 227 Iowa 427, 288
N. W 441 at page 443.62(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1935) 77 F (2d) 478.
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ot the two corporations into a single entity, or makes one
either the principal or agent of the other
"But. notwithstanding this, we are constrained by the
uncontradicted facts to the conclusion that the sales com-
pany was, as it was controlled, and as it functioned,
merely an agency or department of the lumber company
All of its assets were furnished, and all of its stock owned
by the lumber company, its officers, directors, and its main
office were the same as those of the lumber company, and
its emiployees had, for the most part, formerly been employees
of the lumber company. But the strongest undispitted facts
constraining us to this conclision are that the president of
the lumber company had the power to vote all of the stock
of the sales company, and aside from this power which was
not of itself unusual, had the power to remove ani, officer
or director of the sales company without cause or notice, and
to dominate and control performance of its contracts. More-
over, the sales company did nothing not theretofore done by
the lumber company which in forming it only split its busi-
ness into a manufacturing department which it retained,
and a sales department which it transferred to the sales
company, but over which it retained thoroughgoing, ulti-
mate control. "n:'
In Cannon Manufacturing Co. v Cudahy Packing Company, 4
the machinery for independent corporation activity was main-
tained. External appearances convinced the Court of the existence
of a separate corporate entity
The defendant, a Maine corporation, marketed its prodtcts ii
North Carolina through a subsidiary, an Alabama corporation,
which it completely dominated through stock ownership and
otherwise. The Supreme Court held that the concentration of the
Alabama corporation s stock in the defendant's single ownership
and the legal consequences of this under the Alabama law did not
have the effect of rendering its business in North Carolina the
business of the defendant for purposes of jurisdiction.
Ir Justice Brandeis, delivering the judgment of the Court,
said,
"The Alabama corporation, which has an office in North
Carolina, is the instrumentality employed to market Cudahy
products within the state, but it does not do so as de-
fendant's agent. It buys from the defendant and sells to
dealers. In fulfillment of such contracts to sell, goods
packed by the defendant in Iowa are shipped direct to
o3Ibd., at page 487
64(1925) 267 U. S. 333, 45 S. Ct. 250, 69 L. Ed. 634.
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dealers, and from them the Alabama corporation collects
the purchase price. Through ownership of the entire capi-
tal stock and otherwise, the defendant dominates the -%la-
bama corporation, immediately and completely, and exerts
its control both commercially and financially in substan-
tially the same way, and mainly through the same indi-
viduals, as it does over those selling branches or depart-
ments of its business not separately incorporated which are
established to market the Cudahy products in other states.
The existence of the Alabama company as a. distinct corpo-
rate entity is, however, in all respects observed. Its books
are kept separate. All transactions between the two corpora-
tions are represented by appropriate entries in their respec-
tive books in the samne way as if the twa were wholly
independent corporations. This corporate separation from
the general Cudahy business was doubtless adopted solely
to secure to the defendant some advantage under the local
laws. The question is simply whether the corporate separa-
tion carefully maintained must be ignored in determining
the existence of jurisdiction. In the case at bar, the
identity of interest may have, been more complete and the
exercise of control over the subsidiary more irnnate than
in the three cases cited,65 but that fact has, in the absence
-of an applicable statute, no legal significance. The corporate
separation, though perhaps merely formal, was real. It was
not pure fiction." 6
In American Package Corporation v. Comntr of Internal Reve-
nuzie,67 taxpayer was incorporated pursuant to a reorganization
which was effected by an agreement that taxpayer should issue its
stock for stock of four corporations which became taxpayer's sub-
sidiaries. Held, dividends which subsidiaries declared and paid to
taxpayer in tax year were in fact and in law "dividends" rather
than "income" received by the taxpayer.
Soper, Circuit Judge, drew some fine lines in deciding that
here there was a sufficiently separate corporate organization. The
criteria seem highly artificial.
"More particularly it is pointed out with respect to each
subsidiary corporation that the parent corporation desig-
I nates the officers and employees, discharges and fixes the
salaries of all employees except common laborers, that it
6 5These were Conley v. Mathieson Alkali Works, (1902) 190 U. S.
406, 409-411, 23 S. Ct. 728, 47 L. Ed. 1113, Peterson v. Chicago R. I. and
P Ry. Co., (1907) 205 U. S. 364, 391, 27 S. Ct. 513, 51 L. Ed. 841,
People's Tobacco Co., Ltd., v. American Tobacco Co., (1918) 246 U. S.
79, 87, 38 S. Ct. 233, 62 L. Ed. 587, Ann. Cas. 1918C, 537
66(1925) 267 U. S. 333 at pages 335-338, 45 S. Ct. 250, 69 L. Ed. 634.
But the failure to observe the formalities is not always fatal.
0 7 (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1942) 125 F (2d) 413.
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arranges all financing for the business as a whole, allocating
the money among the subsidiaries as it deems proper, that
it buys all the raw materials, distributes them amongst the
subsidiaries and directs the kind of product to be inanu-
factured and the improvements and repairs to be made
by each, that it controls the accounting and consolidates the
accounts of all the subsidiaries into one general accounting
system. In practical effect, the parent corporation is the
controlling head and the subsidiaries are the departments
or branches of a single business.
"On the other hand, it should be noted that each sub-
sidiary has title to its own assets and operates its own plant
subject to the parental control. ,,08
In some cases, even when all the formalities of a separate cor-
porate organization are observed the Courts will disregard tile
corporate entity To show this anomaly, the following cases are in
point.
In The Willem Van Driel, Sr. ,6 a railroad company owned all
the stock of an elevator company, .except a few shares necessary to
qualify the latter's officers, and leased the elevator to another rail-
road company (Penn. Ry Co.) for 999 years, the latter assuming
liability for damages. Separate corporate organizations were main-
tamed. The lessee was held liable for the loss to vessels by lire
communicated on account of negligence in the operation of the
elevator.
68Page 415.
The instant case is compared with U. S. v. Brager Building and Land
Corporation, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1941) 124 F (2d) 349, where the corporate
separateness of a subsidiary was ignored since it existed merely to hold title
to real estate and had no other function or activity. Cf. note 36, also Inland
Development Co. v! Comm'r, discussed supra, where the corporate entity
was ignored. At page 989 the Court said, "This taxpayer owned all of the
stock of the several subsidiaries. Each subsidiary owned no assets whatever
except the one lease transferred to it in the manner indicateed. The sub-
sidiary in each instance executed the contract under which the well was
drilled, but the taxpayer paid all the costs and expenses of drilling and
operation, and it received directly all of the income arising from the sale
of royalty oil. The subsidiaries had no employees, the work on the lease-
hold estates being done by employees of the taxpayer, no offices, no books,
except those kept by employees of the taxpayer ii its offices, and no bank
account. They did not buy, acquire, manage, control, sell, receive, or pay
out anything. The taxpayer did all that, without voice on the part of the
subsidiaries." Cf. also Interstate Transit Lines v. Comn'r of Internal
Revenue, discussed supra, where separate accounting records, though kept
at the offices of the principal by the same employees who kept the prin-
cipal's records, appeared to have been an important factor in the court's
opinion for retaining the corporate entity concept.
See also Cintas v. American Car & Foundry Co., (1942) 131 N. J.
Eq. 419, 25 A. (2d) 418, Esmond Mills v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue,
(C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1943) 132 F (2d) 753.
co(C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1918) 252 Fed. 35.
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Woods, Circuit Judge, said,
"The inquiry remains whether the Pennsylvania Rail-
road is liable as a participant in the operation of the eleva-
tors by reason of its control of the elevator company. This
depends upon the question of fact whether the elevator com-
pany, although in nanic and organ izatton a distirct corpo-
ration, was in substance a mere corporate agent or instru-
mentality of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company.
"It is true that the elevator -company and its stockholders
and directors held meetings, but in all essential particulars
their action was dictated and controlled by the railroad
company. . It would be impossible to imagine a relation-
ship between corporations where the subsidiary corpora-
tion was more completely under the control of the dominant
corporation. The elevators were constructed and operated
merely as a facility to the business of the railroad company.
Applying the language of Judge Wallace in Lehigh Valley
Railroad Co. v. Dupont, the potential and ultimate control
of all its property and business affairs of the elevator com-
pany was lodged in the railroad company, and this control
was exercised as completely and as directly as the machinery
of corporate organisms would permit. Such complete
dominance and control by the railroad company made the
elevator company its mere puppet. ,o
Insufficiency of assets is sometimes given as tli reason for dis-
regarding the corporate entity, though the machinery for corporate
activity is maintained.
In Dixze Minnig and Manufacturing Coinpany v. IVilliams,-*
an action was brought against the sole shareholder to recover for
the negligent death of plaintiff's decedent. The company for which
the decedent was working at the time of his death was bankrupt
and admitted liability. This company was one of several which the
defendant owned and which he had formed to carry on different
phases of his business. The assets with which the company em-
ploying the decedent commenced business apparently were rela-
tively insignificant,' although there was no suggestion that the
statutory requirement for the payment into the company of $1,000
in capital had not been complied with. Personal liability was n-
posed upon the sole shareholder upon the ground that his coin-
pany was a mere simulacrum formed for the dual purpose of
avoiding personal liability and of reserving to his own use and
benefit the profits which might arise from the business.
7Obid., at page 38.
71(1930) 221 -Ala. 331, 128 So. 799. This case is discussed in Professor
Fuller's article on one-man companies, (1938) 51 Harv. L. R. 1373-1405.
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In Mosher v Salt River Valley Water Users' Assn.. 7 2 a sole
shareholder was held personally responsible for corporate obliga-
tions. the fact being stressed that the corporation was without
assets.
The requirements of assets goes to the very heart of the prob-
lem and represents an attempt to enforce the policy of the law
This idea appears to be recognized in the Federal Banking Act of
1933. It provides that stock in banks belonging to the Federal Re-
serve System may be owned by holding companies but requires
that the holding companies invest in marketable assets, if the
stockholders of the holding company are not to be subject to assess-
ments made upon the stock, marketable assets up to 25% of the
aggregate par value of'the bank stock must be acquired if the
stockholders are to be subject to assessment, a lesser amotint of
reserve is required.
7 3
In Centmont Corporation v Marsch,7 4 and Brusselback v Cago
Corporation,5 the stockholders took special care that the corporate
activities were conducted through the proper corporate channels.
Nevertheless, the court overlooked these formalities and disre-
garded the corporate entity
We can conclude by saying that this third test-the corl)orate
entity will be disregarded when it is but "instrumentality, adjunct.
agent or alter ego" of an individual or another corporation"-s
also vague and uncertain.
IV
Another test often resorted to by the Courts is based upon
general l)rinciples of equity applied in its widest sense The corpo-
rate entity will be disregarded when not to do so would produce
an inequitable result. This test turnishes a convenient excuse for
jud es to disregard theory and look at facts in deciding cases.,
\gaim. it tends to make the law uncertain in its application.
In Grotheer v 3lever Rosenberg,76 an attempt to evade a legal
obligation tailed. The defendant in the case organized a corpora-
tion a few (lays prior to the commencement of a creditors' action
against him. The Court held the corporation liable for his debts.
7"_-(1932) 39 Ariz. 567 8 P (2d) 1077
73Bank Act of 1933. Sec. 19. 15 U. S. C. A. Sec. 61 (1935) See also(1941) 26 Iowa L. R. 350-366.74 (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1933) 68 F (2d) 460.
7'(S.D. N.Y. 1938) 24 F Supp. 524.
76(1936) 11 Cal. (2d) 268, 53 P (2d) 996.
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Knight, Justice, declared.
" The separateness of the person and the corporation
would of course be recogyized if no inequitable results
would follow. But, where, as here, an inequitable result
would follow,, the two should be considered as one.
An early case where the corporate entity was disregarded to
avoid an inequitable result is Bank of United States v. Deveaux.
Although a corporation itself is not a citizen, yet when it is com-
posed of citizens of one State, it may sue a citizen of another
State in the circuit court of the United States.
Marshall, C. J., said,
"'That corporations composed of citizens are considered
by the legislature as citizens, under certain circumnstances,
is to be strongly inferred from the registering act. It never
could be intended that an American registered vessel,
abandoned to an insurance company composed of citizens
should lose her character as an American vessel, and yet
this would be the consequence of declaring that the members
of the corporation were, to every intent and purpose, out of
view, and merged in the corporation. ,, o
Sometimes after a' testator has organized a corporation and has
transferred property to it, he would forget the transfer and give
such property away in his will as if it was still his own. The Courts
will often disregard the corporate' entity to effectuate the inten-
tion of such person when no adverse interests are affected. The
result is an equitable one.
In re Turlev's Estate,80 T purchased the home where his widow
now resided and title was taken in the name of a newly organized
company called the "Judicial Realty Company, Inc." Since that
time T, the wife, and the children have resided there. T executed
a contract to purchase the property in his own name, but had the
title taken in the name of the Realty Company which was organ-
ized on May 27, 1922. On June 6, 1922, a resolution of the Board
of Directors -Was adopted authorizing the purchase of the decedent's
(T's) interest in the same contract. All the money which went
into the purchase of this home was furnished by decedent. After
T's death, it was learned that no certificates of stock had been
issued to anyone. The stock certificates were never taken out of
Z7Ibid., at page 998. See also State Trust & Savings Bank v. Hemiosa
Land & Cattle Co., (1925) 30 N. M. 566, 240 Pac. 469. This case is discussed
in Note, (1926) 39 Harv. L. M. 652-653.
78(1809) 5 Cranch (U.S.) 61, 3 L. Ed. 38.
79 (1809) 5 Cranch (U.S.) 61, at page 90, 3 L. Ed. 38.
80(1936) 160 Misc. 190, 289 N. Y. S. 704.
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the stock certificate book. The infant, appearing by special guardian.
brought a petition to show cause why the stock of tile Judicial
Realty Company, Inc., should not be transferred to the widow
Slater, Surrogate, said,
"'On legal principle the title is in the corporation as a
legal entity and artificial personality The courts, however
have pierced the veil of corporate entity to sustain a gift
and, if need be, to impress a trust upon the real property
standing in the name of the corporation. There are no inter-
vening interests. Here the decedent was the equitable
owner of the property He supplied the consideration for
its purchase. In order to effectuate the intention of a per-
son, the doctrine of corporate entity may be disregarded.
The tesfimony reveals that the corporation was used as a
mere dummy or name for James A. Turley The corporate
entity will be charged with the knowledge which its real
owner possessed pertaining to the matter of the decedent's
treatment of the title. "81
The same result was reached in Matter of Busch.8 2 Testator
was the sole owner of the shares of a corporation which he had
formed as a convenience in carrying on his financial operations,
He bequeathed shares of another company owned by his company
to a designated beneficiary It was contended that the gift failed
as the shares were the property of the corporation and not of the
testator After the testator's death the corporation was dissolved,
The bequest was sustained.
But in two other cases the intention of the testator was not
enough to disregard the corporate entity
In Fidelity Union Trust Co. z, Vander Roest83 the syllabus
of the Court reads as follows
"Testator gave his estate to a trustee to pay the income to his
son for ten years, then the principal , over if the son dies within
ten years. By codicil lie devised to the son certain real property
title to which was in a corporation of which the testator owned all
the capital stock, held, a. the corporate fiction may not be disre-
garded and the legal title does not pass by the codicil, b, the trustee
will effectuate the testator's intention by causing the corporation
to convey the property "
Backes, Vice Chancellor, said,
" Nor can the devise be given effect upon the theory
81Ibid., at pages 706-707
82(1925) 124 Misc. 674, 209 N. Y. S. 776.
83(1933) 113 N. J. Eq. 368, 166 Atd. 918.
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advanced by the devisee that 'the equitable title was in the
testator by virtue of possessing all the capital stock of the
company Absolte ownership is in the corporation, for the
ultimate beneficial use of stockholders, in a sense as trustee
for them, but stockholders have neither legal nor equitable
estate in the property of the corporation. The corporation
alone can convey. Neither a majority nor all the stock-
holders can divest it of title. They may accomplish but
themselves cannot do it. The corporation is their instru-
ment, they the instrumentalities by which it- functions
extra-ordinarily, and through their appointees, the board
of directors, ordinarily. 1384
In Crane v. Horton,si testator under will gave his son under-
taking business and bank deposit and directed executors to divide
proceeds of real estate among his wife, son, and daughter. The
residue, including bills receivable, was also given to them. The
testator had organized a corporation which owned the undertaking
business, bank deposits, bills receivable, and some real estate. The
Court held that the property must be equally divided among resi-
duary legatees.
Rugg, Chief Justice, declared,
"The testator was president and treasurer of the corpo-
ration until his death and he conducted its business of
undertaking much as he would conduct his own business,
without directors' meetings or much other strictly corporate
activity. But the business was conducted in the corporate
name. Purchases and bills were made in the corporate
name. The stationery and bill heads were in the corporate
name or in the name of H. R. Crane & Company The
bank account was in the name of H. R. Crane & Company.
Certificates of condition were filed with the Commissioner
of Corporations from 1926 to 1931, inclusive. These certifi-
cates recited the holding of stockholders' meetings in each
year from 1926 to 1930.
The corporation is not a party to these proceedings.
It has not been and could not well be argued that this
is a case where the corporate entity can be disregarded and
the testator treated as the sole owner of all its prop-
erty. 2,,s
This was a particularly hard decision. The intention of the
testator should have been carried out by disregarding the corpo-
rate entity for equitable reasons and for the reason that formalities
of corporate existence were only loosely adhered to.
84Ibid, at page 920.
85(1934) 287 Mass. 160, 191 N. E. 391.
86Ibid., at page 392.
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Again in Gallagher v. Germania Brewing Company,87 although
disregarding the corporate entity would have brought an equitable
result, the Court refused to do so.
Plaintiff, as assignee of Westphal under general assignment
for benefit of creditors, brought the action to recover for goods
sold and delivered by his assignor to the defendant corporation.
B and V H intervened, and set up in their complaint that they
owned, and tor nearly two years had owned, (each half), all the
capital stock of the defendant, no other person but themselves
having any interest in the stock or property of the corporation,
that each of them had a valid and unsatisfied judgment against
N\Nestphal upon a cause of action which accrued before the assign-
ment to the plaintiff that Westphal was, and for over two years
had been, utterly insolvent. The relief sought was that their claims
against Westphal might be allowed, in equal amounts, as equitable
set-offs to the claim of the plaintiff against the defendant corpora-
tion. This was not granted.
Mitchell. Justice. though admitting that to disregard the corpo-
rate entity here would bring about a more equitable result, never-
theless decided against doing so.
"The facts ot the present case appeal to a natural sense
of justice. for while, by fiction of law a corporation is a
distinct entity yet in reality it is an association of persons
who are in fact the beneficial owners of all the corporate
property Hence, it interveners cannot set off their claims,
the practical result is that Westphal's estate will collect its
entire claim out of what is really their property while the
estate is at the same time indebted to them on claims of
greater amount, which they will wholly lose because of
Westphal's insolvency but, as has been often said, hard
cases are liable to make bad law If the rights or
liabilities of a corporation could be affected bv the acts of
the stockholders. except when acting in the corporate name.
or if shareholders could set up their several equities against
persons having claims against the corporations, or, con-
versely, if claims in tavor of the corporation could be set off
against claims against individual stockholders, it can easily
be seen into what confusion and chaos corporate affairs
would inevitably fall. Inasmuch as the two mnterveners own
all the stock of this corporation, the facts ot this case seem
comparatively free from embarrassments, and the conten-
tion of respondent quite plausible. Btt. suppose there were
fifty other stockholders, (which would not alter the prin-
ciple), what would be the result? Could interveners then
87(1893) 53 Minn. 214, 54 N. W 1115.
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interpose their claims as- set-offs, and, if so, could they do
so to the full amount of their claims, or only in the propor-
tion which their shares bore to the whole capital stock?
And, if the former, would they have a claim for the excess
against the corporation, or a right to call on the other
stockholders for contribution ss
These are good reasons. They could very well apply to those
cases where the entity is disregarded.
It is not alvas true that the observance of corporate entity
will bring about an inequitable result, even when the intention of
the corporators was to provide a means of insulation. On the con-
trary, in most instances such observance works an injustice to
no one.
In Donnell v. Herring-Hall-Mar-an Safe Co.,8 9 the Supreme
Court held that a stockholder, even though he was also an officer
of a corporation bearing his family name, does not necessarily
lose his right-to carry on this business of manufacturing the same
commodity under his own name because that corporation sold its
good will, trade name, etc., and as a stockholder and officer he
participated in the sale.
Mr. Justice Holmes delivered judgment.
"Philosophy may have gained by the attempts in recent
years to look through the fiction to the fact and to general-
ize corporations, partnerships and other groups into a single
conception. But to generalize is to omit, and in this instance
to omit one characteristic of the complete corporation, as
called into being under modern statutes, that is most in-
portant in business and law A leading irpose of such
statutes and of those who act under them is to interpose a
non-conductor, through which in matters of contract it is
impossible to see the men behind. However it might be with a
partnership, when. this corporation sold its rights ecery-
body had notice and knew i fact that it was not selling the
rights, personal 'to its nembers, even if. as always, they
really received the consideration, or, as usual, they all
assented to its act. That it contracted for such assent, if it
did, by its undertaking to dissolve, does not make the con-
SS(1893) 53 Minn. 214, 54 N. W 1115 at pages 1116-1117 See also
Oliver v. Oliver, (1903) 118 Ga. 362, 45 S. E. 232. This case is discussed
in Note, (1940) 38 Mich. L. R. 113-159. Strong v. Repide, (1909) 213
U. S. 419, 29 S. Ct. 521, 53 L. Ed. 853, Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry.
Co. v. Des Momes Union Ry. Co. ,(1920) 254 U. S. 196, 41 S. Ct. 81. 65
L. Ed. 219; Damascus Mfg. Co. v. Union Trust Co., (1928) 119 Ohio St.
439, 164 N. E. 530; Adams v. Morgan, (1935) 142 Kan. 865, 52 P (2d)
643, Newton v. Tracy Loan & Trust Co., (1935) 88 Utah 547, 40 P (2d)
204, Rowan v. Harburney Oil Co., (C.C.A. 10th Cir. 1937) 91 F (2d) 122.
s9 (1908) 208 U. S. 267, 28 S. Ct. 288, 52 L. Ed. 481.
373 1
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
tract theirs. But the case does not stop there. The purchas-
ing company had the possibility of conipetition from the
Halls before, its imind and gave the measure of its expecta-
tions and demands by the personal contracts that it required.
Those contracts were limited in time iind scope and have
been discharged. -.'90
The italics are added to show how important was the fact that
no one had been misled by the fiction of corporate entity There
was no inequitable result.
Similarly in Gillis v Jenkins Petroleum Process Co.,9' a cor-
poration which organized a subsidiary which obtained licenses
for use of patents, and guaranteed payment for use, was held
not to be a "licensee" by virtue of the close relafionship between
it and the subsidiary so as to impose liability upon the corpora-
tion's receiver who purchased the subsidiary's assets. Licensor
was not damaged by alleged belief that the subsidiary was instru-
mentality of the corporation, and the close relationship was not
enough to make the subsidiary a mere agency
Denman, Circuit Judge, said
\Ve think it well settled law that the organization
of one conipauv, by another, or the owoncrship of all the
stock of one company by another, or common officers and
directors, or all of these elements combined, are not suf-
ficient to defeat separate corporate entity.
"There are, of course, situations calling for disregard
of the corporate entity Some of them are instances
-where too close a relationship between two or more corpora-
tions offends a statute or circumvents public policy. No
such question is involved here. Apart from the public aspect
of the problem, corporate entity will be disregarded when
necessary to prevent fraud upon a private party or when
one conmipany is, in fact, nothing but an agent of another.
Neither such situation obtains here. There is 11o assertion
that Jenkins was in the slightest mieasure misled into think-
mg that the relationshp between Western and Petrolgas
was other than it was, and not the slightest evidence that
Jenkins was in any way damaged even if it had been so
misled."5 -
It is not improper to consider here two cases on organization
proceedings under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act. In both
9OIbid., at pages 273 to 274.
The italics are added to show how important was the fact that no one
had been misled by the fiction of corporate entity. There was no inequitable
result.
91(C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1936) 84 F (2d) 74.92Ibid., at pages 79-80.
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the corporate entity was disregarded to bring about a more equit-
able result.
In Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Conipai3,0 3 a parent
corporation with complete control of a subsidiary grossly nis-
managed its affairs through many years, and, according to the
accounts between them, became its creditor in an enormous sum.
The preferred stockholders of the subsidiary had no voice in its
management because the charter denied them voting power so
long as dividends were paid them, and because the dominant
corporation caused the subsidiary, notwithstanding its precarious
condition, to pay such dividends when due.
In a reorganization proceeding under Section 77B of the
Bankruptcy Aft, the Court approved a compromise of the parent
company's claim, and on that basis approved a plan of reorganiza-
tion involving formation of a new successor corporation, discharge
of other obligations, and satisfaction of the compromised claim by
awarding to the parent company a large majority of the new com-
pany's common stock, thus continuing its complete control, but
allowing only a minority of such stock to the old preferred stock-
holders.
M\r- justice Roberts, in delivering judgment for the Supreme
Court, looked behind the curtain of corporate entity to allow
an equitable solution?4 The parent cannot be allowed to con-
trol the subsidiary to such an extent as before. If a reorganization
is effected, the amount at which the parent company's claim is
allowed is not important if it is to be represented by stock in the
new company, provided the stock to be awarded it is subordinate
to that awarded preferred stockholders of the bankrupt.
In First National Bank of Herkiner v. Poland Union," the
Court looked at realities throughout to effect an equitable re-
sult. Debtor was a cooperative country store organized as a
partnership but operating as a company with shares of stock, of-
ficers and directors. No certificate for business organization of
any kind had been filed. A bankruptcy petition under Section
77B-G and its successor. Chapter X,D which did not extend to the
reorganization of individuals and general partnerships, was al-
lowed on the grounds that the -debtor was more of a joint stock
company-than a partnership. For purposes of discharge, however,
93(1939) 306 U. S. 307, 59 S. Ct. 543, 83 L. Ed. 669.94See pages 315-324 of the case.
95(C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1940) 109 F (2d) 54.
9648 Stat. 912, 11 U. S. C., Sec. 207 (1934).
-752 Stat. 883 et seq. 11 U. S. C., Secs. 509-676. (Supp. 1938)
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individual members were not freed from liability for the debts of
the company 9s
This concludes our examination of cases where corporate en-
tity was disregarded to effect an equitable result. We can say
that this test, like the others, is a vague and a much'too uncertain
one to be satisfactory
We have now completed our examination of cases falling
under tour general classes where the corporate entity is disre-
garded. It must be understood, however, that not all Courts accept
even this wide classification, which classification is wholly ar-
bitrary, being devised by the writer only to indicate the trend
of the decisions, and to show the lack of agreement among the
judges as to when the corporate entity will be disregarded.
OsIn joint stock companies, members are generally subject to unlimited
individual liability. This case is discussed in Note, (1940) 49 Yale L. J.
1331-1335.
99For other cases, see further, United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator
Transit Co., (E.D. Wis. 1905) 142 Fed. 247, Gallagher v. Germania Brew-
ing Co., (1893) 53 Minn. 214, 54 N. W 1115, Minifie v. Rowley, (1922)
187 Cal. 481. 202 Pac. 673, Wenban Estate v. Hewlett, (1924) 193 Cal. 675,
227 Pac. 723.
